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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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     * Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States 
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. 
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RESTANI, Judge. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brown appeals the 
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“the 
Commissioner”) denial of his application for supplemental 
security income (“SSI”). For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
In March 2006, Joseph Brown, a fifty-one year old man 
with a history of violent crime and drug abuse, applied for SSI 
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 1381 et 
seq. Despite alleging a disability beginning in April 2002 due to 
bipolar disorder and anxiety, his application was initially denied 
in October 2006 because his “condition [was] not severe enough 
to keep [him] from working.” Admin. R. 109. Upon Brown’s 
request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) in February 2008 (“the hearing”). At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the ALJ determined that Brown was not disabled 
because he “has been capable of making a successful adjustment 
to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 
economy.” App. to Br. of Appellant A10. Brown then filed an 
appeal with the appeals council, but the administrative appeals 
judge concluded that there was “no reason . . . to review the 
[ALJ=s] decision.” Admin. R. 1. 
In May 2009, Brown filed this lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In 
a report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded 
that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 
and recommended that Brown’s request for review be denied. 
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The District Court reviewed the issues raised by Brown’s 
objections, and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, concluding that the ALJ’s decision was indeed 
supported by substantial evidence. Brown now appeals. 
JURISDICTION AND APPELLATE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 
' 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291. “[O]ur 
review of the ALJ’s decision is more deferential as we 
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
decision of the Commissioner.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
DISCUSSION 
We begin by addressing in some detail the standard of 
review a district court should apply when reviewing a magistrate 
judge’s findings in an SSI claim. 
A district court may “designate a magistrate judge to 
conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit 
to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations for the disposition” of certain matters pending 
before the court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(b). In such cases, “the 
magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings and 
recommendations. . . with the court and a copy shall forthwith 
be mailed to all parties.” Id. ' 636(b)(1)(c). “Within fourteen 
days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file 
written objections to such proposed findings and 
recommendations as provided by rules of court.” Id. ' 636(b)(1). 
If a party timely and properly files such a written objection, the 
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District Court “shall make a de novo determination of those 
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. (emphasis 
added). We have provided that ' 636(b)(1) requires district 
courts to review such objections de novo unless the objection is 
“not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). 
The District Court misapplied that framework to this 
case. Brown timely filed written objections challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Magistrate Judge’s 
findings rested. In considering these objections, the District 
Court stated that “objections which merely rehash arguments 
presented to and considered by a magistrate judge are not 
entitled to de novo review.” Morgan v. Astrue, No. 08-2133, 
2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009). That is not 
correct; any appeal to a district court based on an objection to a 
Magistrate Judge’s order will “rehash arguments presented to 
and considered by” the Magistrate Judge. That is—by 
definition—the very nature of “review.” In SSI appeals, the 
plain language of ' 636(b)(1) and our ruling in Goney, make 
clear that the standard district courts should apply to such 
objections is de novo. The District Court’s articulation of the 
standard of review was therefore erroneous. 
The error, however, was harmless. An error is “harmless” 
when, despite the technical correctness of an appellant=s legal 
contention, there is also “no set of facts” upon which the 
appellant could recover. Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 
341 (3d Cir. 2010). In this case, the rulings by the Magistrate 
Judge to which Brown objected were based upon facts found by 
the ALJ. Under 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g), “[t]he findings of the 
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 
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substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” Upon Brown=s 
appeal from the ALJ’s finding, the task of the Magistrate Judge 
was thus to determine whether the ALJ’s ruling was “supported 
by substantial evidence.” Id. And, upon Brown’s appeal from 
the Magistrate Judge’s rulings, the task of the District Court was 
to determine—de novo—whether the Magistrate Judge reached 
the correct conclusion. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1). Upon review of 
the record, we conclude that although the District Court stated 
that Brown’s objections were “not entitled to de novo review,” it 
also did consider whether each of the rulings from which Brown 
appeals were supported by substantial evidence. Because, as set 
forth below, the District Court correctly found that substantial 
evidence supported the ALJ=s findings, those findings were 
“conclusive,” 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1), and bound the District 
Court, Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“We will not set the Commissioner=s decision aside if it is 
supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have 
decided the factual inquiry differently.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
' 405(g), and Monsour Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 
1190-1191 (3d. Cir.1986)). Having found “substantial evidence” 
for the ALJ=s findings, there was “no set of facts” upon which 
the District Court could find in Brown=s favor. Renchenski, 622 
F.3d at 341. 
I. The ALJ=s Determination 
A. The Weight Afforded to Brown=s Treating 
Psychiatrist’s Opinion  
Brown claims that the ALJ’s decision to not adopt the 
opinion of his treating psychiatrist was not supported by 
substantial evidence. This claim lacks merit. 
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The ALJ determined that Brown did not qualify for SSI 
after finding that he was capable of performing simple, routine 
work despite his disability. Dr. Richard Cohen, a medical expert 
who testified at the hearing, concluded that Brown retained the 
capacity to perform “simple repetitive tasks.” App. to Br. of 
Appellant A19. The ALJ explained that Cohen’s conclusion was 
supported by record evidence from Alex Siegel, Ph.D., a state 
agency disability consultant, who advised that Brown “is able to 
meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a 
sustained basis despite the limitations resulting from his 
impairments.” Admin. R. 272; see App. to Br. of Appellant A8. 
Although there was record evidence from a treating psychiatrist 
suggesting a contrary conclusion,1 the ALJ is entitled to weigh 
all evidence in making its finding. See Kertesz v. Crescent Hills 
Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986) (providing that an 
“ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any 
medical expert, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw 
its own inferences”). As the ALJ clearly explained why she gave 
greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Cohen, her decision was 
supported by substantial evidence and was not contrary to law.2
                                                 
1 Dr. Jesus Herrera, the treating psychiatrist who saw 
Brown four times, stated that if Brown were to work, he would 
miss “12 days to 15 days” of work a month due to his mental 
impairment. 
 
2 Brown argues that an ALJ may not disregard the 
opinion of a treating physician. The law is clear, however, that 
the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the 
issue of functional capacity. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 
47-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing that “a statement by a plaintiff’s 
treating physician supporting an assertion that [plaintiff] is 
disabled or unable to work is not dispositive of the issue” 
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See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(providing that if “the opinion of a treating physician conflicts 
with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ 
may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no 
reason or for the wrong reason” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(providing that an ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating 
physician if “two physicians in the state agency evaluated the 
medical findings . . . and concluded that those findings did not 
reveal any condition that would preclude gainful employment”). 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it affirmed the 
Commissioner’s decision in this regard. 
B. Brown=s Functional Capacity 
Next, Brown contends that the ALJ’s finding as to the 
credibility of his claimed limitations is not supported by 
substantial evidence. This claim also lacks merit. 
An ALJ must give “subjective complaints >serious 
consideration,’ . . . and ma[k]e specific findings of fact, 
including credibility, as to [a plaintiff’s] residual functional 
capacity.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citation omitted). The ALJ ultimately determined that, contrary 
to Brown’s claim, he was not disabled. As previously discussed, 
the ALJ relied on Dr. Cohen’s assessment that Brown could 
work. In further support of this conclusion, the ALJ cited record 
evidence that Brown had a good relationship with his girlfriend, 
liked to fix things around the house, was skilled at carpentry, 
and had not recently been involved in physical altercations. 
                                                                                                             
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Medical notes on the record also indicate that Brown’s “physical 
appearance was appropriate,” his “[m]emory was good; insight 
and judgment were fair,” his “[m]otor activity was normal and 
speech was articulated,” his “[a]ttitude was polite and behavior 
was cooperative,” and that his “eye contact was good.” Admin. 
R. 238.  The ALJ’s finding as to Brown=s functional capacity, 
therefore, was supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Plummer 
v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing that 
“[s]ubstantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Accordingly, the District Court did not err 
when it affirmed the Commissioner’s determination in this 
regard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, any error in the District 
Court’s articulation of the standard of review was harmless, and 
the District Court was correct to find that the Commissioner’s 
determination was supported by substantial evidence. 
Accordingly, the District Court’s order granting judgment to the 
defendant will be affirmed. 
